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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Defendant Better Business Bureau of the Southland, Inc. appeals from an order 
denying its special motion to strike the complaint of plaintiff Budget Van Lines, Inc. 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1  We affirm. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 A. The Parties 
 Budget Van Lines, Inc. (Budget) is a relocation services broker that has been in 
business since 2005 and maintains its principal place of business in New York.  
According to Budget‟s president, Sheri Katz, “[m]oving companies move Household 
Goods whereas Brokers arrange for moving companies to do the actual moves,” and 
Budget “is a „Household Goods Broker.‟” 
 Better Business Bureau of the Southland, Inc. doing business as The Better 
Business Bureau (the BBB) is a nonprofit voluntary membership organization.  
According to the BBB‟s president, William Mitchell, the “goals of the BBB are to 
advocate truth in advertising as well as to promote integrity in the performance of 
business services” and “to enhance public trust and confidence in business through 
voluntary self-regulation and monitoring activities.”  The BBB provides free information 
to consumers by telephone, mail, and the Internet about a particular company in what the 
BBB calls a Reliability Report.  The Reliability Report includes a record of consumer 
complaints made to the company and the company‟s responses, any governmental action 
against the company, any licensing or advertising issues that the BBB has learned about 
                                              
1  Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 authorizes a special motion to strike, also 
known as an anti-SLAPP motion.  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 53, 57, 66.)  All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure, unless otherwise stated. 
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the company, and a BBB Rating, generally “A+” to “F,” reflecting the extent to which the 
company is in compliance with the BBB‟s standards for operating in a trustworthy 
manner and making good faith efforts to resolve consumer complaints or concerns filed 
with the BBB. 
 
 B. The Complaint 
 On December 27, 2010 Budget filed a complaint against the BBB based on the 
BBB‟s disparaging statements about Budget and the “F” grade that the BBB gave Budget 
on the BBB‟s website.  Budget alleged causes of action for (1) trade libel, (2) libel per se, 
(3) unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the 
UCL), (4) permanent injunction, and (5) declaratory relief.  Budget alleged that the BBB 
“published a number of damaging statements about” Budget, including that Budget was 
“not in compliance with the law‟s licensing or registration requirements,” Budget‟s 
advertising was “grossly misleading,” and Budget deserved a grade of “F.”  Budget 
alleged that “[t]hese statements are all false and defamatory” because Budget is a moving 
broker not a moving company, Budget “is in compliance with all Department of 
Transportation and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration laws and regulations,” 
and Budget‟s “advertising is not misleading in any way.”  Budget alleged that the 
statement that Budget was “not in compliance with the law‟s licensing or registration 
requirements” is libelous because it charged Budget with violating the law, and the 
statement that Budget‟s advertising is “grossly misleading” is libelous because it charged 
Budget with dishonesty.  Finally, Budget alleged that the BBB knew the statements were 
false or acted with reckless disregard of their truth when the BBB published the 
statements on its website, knew that existing or potential Budget customers would view 
the statements, and published the false statements with malice and the intent to destroy 
Budget‟s business. 
 In its unfair competition cause of action, Budget alleged that the BBB‟s 
publication of false statements about Budget, as well as the BBB‟s repeated attempts to 
compel Better Business Bureaus in other locations to give Budget an “F” or to direct 
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consumers to the BBB‟s website constituted an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business 
practice in violation of the UCL.  Budget claimed that the BBB caused and will continue 
to cause Budget monetary damages and irreparable injury.  In its fourth and fifth causes 
of action, Budget sought injunctive and declaratory relief. 
 
 C. The BBB’s Special Motion To Strike 
 The BBB filed a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16.  Budget 
conceded that the BBB‟s acts were in furtherance of its right of petition or free speech, 
but argued that it had a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims.  In 
support of its opposition to the motion, Budget presented two computer printouts from 
the BBB‟s website entitled “BBB Reliability Report for Budget Van Lines, Inc.”  Katz 
attached to her declaration a Reliability Report about Budget that she had printed from 
the BBB‟s website on September 10, 2010.  Adrianos Facchetti, head of Budget‟s legal 
division, attached to his declaration a slightly different undated version of a Reliability 
Report about Budget.2 
 Both Reliability Reports prominently displayed “BBB Rating F” next to the title 
“Rating Explanation.”  The “Rating Explanation” stated:  “Company Rating F  [¶]  Our 
opinion of what this rating means:  [¶]  We strongly question the company‟s reliability 
for reasons such as that they have failed to respond to complaints, their advertising is 
grossly misleading, they are not in compliance with the law‟s licensing or registration 
requirements, their complaints contain especially serious allegations, or the company‟s 
industry is known for its fraudulent business practices.”  Near the lower right corner of 
the undated Reliability Report attached to Facchetti‟s declaration, under the title “Rating 
                                              
2  The trial court overruled the BBB‟s objections to these exhibits.  The BBB does 
not challenge the trial court‟s evidentiary rulings on appeal. 
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Reasons,” the Reliability Report states:  “Factors that lowered this business‟s rating 
include:  [¶]  Failure to have a required competency license.”3 
 The Reliability Report also stated, “This company‟s business is providing moving 
and storage services.”  Under the heading “Licensing,” the entries labeled “Agency,” 
“License Number” and “Status” were blank.  The next paragraph advised the consumer 
that for the most up-to-date information regarding license status, the consumer should 
contact two governmental agencies that license or register moving companies:  the 
California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA).  In the “Complaint Experience” section, the Reliability Report 
stated:  “Bureau Summary and Analysis of customer complaints and company responses:  
[¶]  Complaints allege failure to honor moving quotes, failure to notify customers that 
their move will be subcontracted out to another carrier, damage and loss claims, delivery 
issues and failure to assist in resolving disputes.  The company generally responds to 
complaints by referring customers to . . . ,” followed by an option to read “More.”  Under 
“Complaint Closing Statistics” appeared a list of the number of complaints by type of 
response “over the last 36 months,” for a total of 128 complaints. 
 Budget argued that the three allegedly defamatory statements—that it “was not in 
compliance with the law or licensing requirements,” that Budget‟s advertising was 
“grossly misleading,” and the “F” rating—were provably false assertions of fact and 
therefore were defamatory.  Budget  argued that the BBB‟s statements did not constitute 
                                              
3  The Reliability Report printed by Facchetti contains the complete version of the 
statement as follows:  “Rating Reasons  [¶]  BBB rating is based on 16 factors.  Click 
here for details about the factors considered.  [¶]  Factors that lowered this business‟s 
rating include:  [¶]  Failure to have a required competency license  [¶]  Length of time 
business has been operating  [¶]  128 complaint(s) filed against business  [¶]  Failure to 
respond to 2 complaint(s) filed against business  [¶]  7 complaints(s) filed against 
business that were not resolved  [¶]  11 serious complaint(s) filed against business  [¶]  
Overall complaint history with BBB[.]”  The Reliability Report printed by Katz also had 
a section entitled “Rating Reasons,” but it did not list all of the reasons.  The section in 
Katz‟s version stated, “Significant reasons for this rating: Unanswered Complaints,” and 
provided what appeared to be a computer link to other information. 
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“privileged statements of opinions” but rather were declarations or conveyed implications 
that “„a reasonable fact finder could conclude [were] provably false assertion[s] of fact.‟  
(Overstock[.com], Inc. v. Gradient [Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688,] 701.”  
Budget also argued that it had shown a probability of success on the merits of its unfair 
competition cause of action with the evidence that “under the guise of providing 
consumer information” the BBB “defames certain companies and then endorses others, 
misleading the public, damaging otherwise reputable businesses, and diverting money to 
itself.” 4  (Italics and bold omitted.) 
 
 D. The Trial Court’s Ruling 
 The trial court denied the special motion to strike.  The court first acknowledged 
that Budget conceded the first prong of section 425.16; namely, the BBB‟s acts were in 
furtherance of its right of petition or free speech.  The trial court ruled, however, that 
Budget met its burden on the second prong of showing a probability of prevailing on each 
cause of action.  The court determined that the BBB‟s statement that Budget was not in 
compliance with licensing laws implied a provably false factual statement, and that 
Budget had presented admissible evidence showing the implied fact was false.  The court 
ruled, however, that the BBB‟s statements about “grossly misleading” advertising and the 
“F” rating were opinions that were not actionable as defamatory statements.  The trial 
court then relied on the court‟s statement in Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. 
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90 that, under section 425.16, “once a plaintiff shows a 
probability of prevailing on any part of its claim, the plaintiff has established that its 
cause of action has some merit and the entire cause of action stands.”  (Mann, supra, at 
p. 106, italics omitted.)  The court also ruled that Budget had shown a probability of 
prevailing on its unfair competition cause of action because Budget had shown that the 
BBB committed an act forbidden by law:  libel per se.  In response to arguments made by 
                                              
4  Budget dismissed its first cause of action for trade libel before the BBB filed its 
special motion to strike. 
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the BBB, the court also found that Budget was not a public figure and that the Reliability 
Reports on the BBB‟s website were commercial speech. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The BBB contends that the trial court erred in denying its special motion to strike 
under section 425.16 because Budget did not carry its burden of proving a probability of 
prevailing on any of its causes of action.  The BBB also argues that its constitutional 
defenses bar Budget‟s causes of action.  We conclude that the trial court properly denied 
the BBB‟s special motion to strike. 
 
 A. Special Motion To Strike Burdens of Proof and Standard of Review 
 “Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), provides:  „A cause of action against a person 
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person‟s right of petition or free 
speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection 
with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court 
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff 
will prevail on the claim.‟  The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion thus involves two 
steps.  „First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that 
the challenged cause of action is one “arising from” protected activity.  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (b)(1).)  If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then must consider 
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.‟  
[Citation.]  „Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—
i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a 
SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.‟  [Citation.]”  (Oasis West Realty, 
LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 819-820; see Scalzo v. Baker (2010) 185 
Cal.App.4th 91, 97-98.)  The defendant has the burden of proof on the first issue; the 
plaintiff has the burden on the second issue.  (Chodos v. Cole (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 
692, 701.) 
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 As noted above, Budget conceded that the BBB had satisfied the first prong.5  (See 
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 819.)  
“To satisfy the second prong, „a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must 
“„state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.‟”  [Citation.]  Put another way, the 
plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by 
a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence 
submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”‟  [Citation.]  „We consider “the pleadings, and 
supporting and opposing affidavits . . . upon which the liability or defense is based.”  
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)  However, we neither “weigh credibility [nor] compare the 
weight of the evidence.  Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff 
[citation] and evaluate the defendant‟s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that 
submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.”‟  [Citation.]  If the plaintiff „can show a 
probability of prevailing on any part of its claim, the cause of action is not meritless‟ and 
will not be stricken; „once a plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing on any part of its 
claim, the plaintiff has established that its cause of action has some merit and the entire 
cause of action stands.‟  [Citation.]”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 820; see Scalzo v. Baker, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 98, fn. 10.) 
 A plaintiff‟s burden of showing a probability of prevailing “is not high.”  
(Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 699.)  A 
plaintiff can meet its burden and defeat a special motion to strike by showing the cause of 
action has “even minimal merit.”  (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th 
at pp. 819-820; Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 
95 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.)  “A plaintiff is not required „to prove the specified claim to the 
trial court‟; rather, so as to not deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial, the appropriate inquiry 
is whether the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.”  (Mann v. 
Quality Old Time Service, Inc., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 105, quoting Rosenthal v. 
                                              
5  Budget does not argue that the commercial speech exception in section 425.17 
applies in this case.  (See Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12.) 
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Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412.)  We review a trial 
court‟s order granting or denying a special motion to strike under section 425.16 de novo.  
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325-326; Bleavins v. Demarest (2011) 196 
Cal.App.4th 1533, 1539; Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc., supra, at p. 929.) 
 
 B. Libel Per Se 
 Libel is a form of defamation.  (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 
supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 700.)  “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a 
publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural 
tendency to injure or causes special damage.”  (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 
1354, 1369; see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.)  Civil Code section 45 
defines libel as “a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, 
or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a 
tendency to injure him in his occupation.”  “In general, . . . a written communication that 
is false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt or 
ridicule or certain other reputational injuries, constitutes libel.”  (Shively v. Bozanich 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242.)  Budget‟s claim is for libel per se, which Civil Code 
section 45a defines as a “libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity 
of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact . . . .” 
 Because a defamatory statement “„“must contain a provable falsehood, courts 
distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of 
defamation liability.”‟”  (Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669, 695.)  The 
First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and press create a constitutional 
privilege that limits liability for defamation under state law for some, but not all, types of 
opinions.  (See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1, 14, 20 [110 S.Ct. 
2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1] [full constitutional protection for statements of opinion on matters 
of public concern that do not contain or imply a provably false factual assertion]; 
Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 600-601 [“courts apply the 
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Constitution by carefully distinguishing between statements of opinion and fact, treating 
the one as constitutionally protected and imposing on the other civil liability for its 
abuse”].)  “Though mere opinions are generally not actionable [citation], a statement of 
opinion that implies a false assertion of fact is . . . .”  (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 
Cal.App.4th 256, 289.)  The “inquiry is not merely whether the statements are fact or 
opinion, but „“whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement 
declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.”‟  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.; see Summit 
Bank, supra, at p. 696 [“where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, 
the opinion can constitute actionable defamation”]; Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. 
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 385 [“the question is not strictly whether the published 
statement is fact or opinion,” but “[r]ather, the dispositive question is whether a 
reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a 
provably false assertion of fact”].) 
 The court looks at the totality of the circumstances “to determine both whether 
(a) a statement is fact or opinion, and (b) a statement declares or implies a provably false 
factual assertion; that is, courts look to the words of the statement itself and the context in 
which the statement was made.”  (Hawran v. Hixson, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.)  
“„This contextual analysis demands that the courts look at the nature and full content of 
the communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the audience to whom the 
publication was directed.‟  [Citation.]”  (Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., supra, 116 
Cal.App.4th at p. 389; see Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.) 
 “Whether a statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact is a 
question of law for the court to decide [citations], unless the statement is susceptible of 
both an innocent and a libelous meaning, in which case the jury must decide how the 
statement was understood.”  (Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 385; see Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260; Chaker 
v. Mateo, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th p. 1147 [“„critical determination of whether the 
allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact or opinion is a question of law‟”]; Summit 
Bank v. Rogers, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 696 [“„crucial question of whether 
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challenged statements convey the requisite factual imputation is ordinarily a question of 
law for the court‟”].)  The principle that the “distinction between fact and opinion is a 
question of law . . . remains the rule if the statement unambiguously constitutes either fact 
or opinion.  Where, . . . however, the allegedly libelous remarks could have been 
understood by the average reader [in the target audience] in either sense, the issue must 
be left to the jury‟s determination.”  (Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 672, 682; Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 
637, 647 [if a statement is ambiguous, the question of law for the court is “whether [the] 
statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation”].)  “The question is 
„“whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or 
implies a provably false assertion of fact. . . .”  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Summit Bank, 
supra, at p. 696.) 
 
  1. Legally Sufficient Complaint 
 The BBB first argues that Budget cannot prevail on its cause of action for libel per 
se because Budget did not properly plead libel.  “„The general rule is that the words 
constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the 
complaint.  [Citations.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 
1017, fn. 3; see Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 31.)  The BBB argues 
Budget alleged in its complaint that it received an “F” rating but failed to identify any 
other specific words or statements by the BBB as defamatory. 
 The BBB misreads Budget‟s complaint.  It is true that Budget alleges that there are 
defamatory statements on the BBB‟s website in addition to the three allegedly 
defamatory statements in the complaint.  But Budget identifies the specific words in those 
three statements that it alleges are libelous.  In addition to the “F” rating, Budget alleged 
that the “BBB published a number of damaging statements about [Budget] including but 
not limited to” the statements that Budget‟s “advertising is „grossly misleading‟” and that 
Budget “is „not in compliance with the law‟s licensing or registration requirement.‟”  
Budget properly pleaded libel.  (Gilbert v. Sykes, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 31.) 
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 The BBB also argues that Budget failed to allege “any special damages as required 
by Civil Code [section] 45a.”  Section 45a, however, requires a plaintiff to plead and 
prove special damages only if the challenged statement is not libelous per se.  (See Civ. 
Code, § 45a [“[d]efamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the 
plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result 
thereof”]; Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 382 [“[w]here a libelous statement 
„is defamatory on its face, it is said to be libelous per se, and actionable without proof of 
special damage‟”]; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 
1135 [plaintiff is “relieved of the [Civil Code] section 45a requirement of pleading 
special damages in order to state a cause of action for libel” where the “publication . . . is 
reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning on its face”].)  The defamatory language 
on which Budget bases its claims is libelous on its face.  (See Bates v. Campbell (1931) 
213 Cal. 438, 441 [statutory definition of libel per see “is very broad and has been held to 
include almost any language which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a 
person‟s reputation, either generally, or with respect to his occupation”]; Burrill, supra, at 
pp. 382-383 [statements charging the commission of a crime or tending to injure the 
plaintiff‟s profession, trade or business are libel per se]; Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 386 [accusations of dishonesty or questionable 
business methods are libel per se].) 
 
  2. “Not in Compliance with the Law‟s Licensing . . . Requirement” 
 The BBB‟s first argument is that it did not make the statements about Budget.  The 
BBB asserts that it “never reported that [Budget] was „not in compliance with licensing 
or registration requirements.‟”6  The BBB claims that the statement about Budget‟s 
                                              
6  The BBB submitted an undated document that Mitchell said was a January 12, 
2011 report for Budget.  This report was entitled “Company Report” but contained 
virtually the same information as the Reliability Reports printed out by Katz and 
Facchetti, except that the Company Report did not include the “Rating Explanation.”  In 
its opening brief, the BBB asserts that the January 12, 2011 Company Report printout 
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licensing status is not defamatory because it is part of the explanation for an “F rating” 
and is not necessarily a statement about Budget.  According to the BBB, the explanation 
indicates that the statement is part of a list of illustrative hypothetical examples of 
conduct, prefaces the list of examples with the words “such as,” and concludes the list 
with the disjunctive “or” before the last example. 
 The BBB asks us to limit our review to the precise language of the words in the 
“Company Rating F” section of the report.  To determine whether a statement is 
susceptible of a defamatory meaning, however, we must consider “„“not only the actual 
language used, but the sense and meaning which may have been fairly presumed to have 
been conveyed to those who read it.”‟”  (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, supra, 
42 Cal.3d at p. 261; see Melaleuca, Inc. v. Clark (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354.)  
“„“That is to say, the publication is to be measured not so much by its effect when 
subjected to the critical analysis of a mind trained in the law, but by the natural and 
probable effect upon the mind of the average reader.”‟  [Citation.]”  (Baker, supra, at 
p. 260; see Carver v. Bond (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 346; Hufstedler, Kaus & 
Ettinger v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 55, 67.)  We must consider the context 
in which the alleged defamatory statement appears, “construed in the light of the whole 
scope and apparent object of the writer, considering not only the actual language used, 
but the sense and meaning which may have been fairly presumed to have been conveyed 
to those who read it.”  (Baker, supra, at p. 261; Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC 
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1338.)  “This contextual analysis demands that the courts 
look at the nature and full content of the communication and to the knowledge and 
understanding of the audience to whom the publication was directed.”  (Baker, supra, at 
p. 261; Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1608.) 
 Considering the context of the Reliability Report on the BBB‟s website, and the 
“„natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader‟” (MacLeod v. Tribune 
                                                                                                                                                  
“said „we know of no licensing or registration requirement for companies engaged in the 
company‟s stated type of business.‟”  This statement, however, does not appear on the 
document. 
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Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 547), we agree with the trial court that the average 
consumer could easily overlook the words “such as” and “or” and focus instead on the 
statements about noncompliance with licensing laws and grossly misleading advertising, 
with the understanding that each statement applied to Budget and supported Budget‟s “F” 
rating.  (See Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 260; 
MacLeod, supra, at p. 547 [a “„defendant is liable for what is insinuated, as well as for 
what is stated explicitly‟”]; Bentley Reserve L.P. v. Papaliolios (July 30, 2013, A136191) 
___ Cal.App.4th ___ [2013 WL 3949029 at p. 5] [“[h]edging his statements with the 
word „likely‟ does not insulate them from examination”]; Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 
Cal.App.4th at p. 346; Ringler Associates Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000) 80 
Cal.App.4th 1165, 1181 [“[i]f a statement of opinion implies a knowledge of facts which 
may lead to a defamatory conclusion, the implied facts must themselves be true”].) 
 In addition to the statements by the BBB explaining its “Company Rating F” for 
Budget, the Reliability Report stated or strongly implied that Budget was not licensed.  
The Reliability Report printed by Facchetti, under the heading “Rating Reasons,” stated 
that the “[f]actors that lowered this business‟s rating include:  [¶]  Failure to have a 
required competency license . . . .”  Another provision on both Reliability Reports, under 
the heading “Licensing,” implied Budget was not licensed by leaving blank spaces under 
the “Licensing” heading and providing no information in the spaces marked “Agency,” 
“License Number,” and “Status.”  The Reports then directed the consumer to telephone 
numbers and Internet addresses for the PUC and FMCSA from which, according to the 
BBB, “[c]ompanies offering to move household goods” are required to obtain a license or 
registration.  Because Budget is a moving broker, however, neither of the agencies could 
reasonably have been expected to report that Budget had the license or registration 
required lawfully to operate a moving company. 
 Budget also provided evidence that the alleged statements were provably false, in 
part because the statements are based on the BBB‟s inaccurate assessment that Budget is 
a moving company rather than a moving broker and the misleading statement in the 
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Reliability Report that Budget‟s “business is providing moving and storage services.”7  
Theodore Clapp, one of Budget‟s in-house attorneys, explained that Budget is a moving 
broker not a moving company and therefore is subject to different laws and regulations 
than a moving company.  Budget submitted pages from its website prominently 
identifying Budget as a “Household Goods Transportation Broker for Interstate Moves” 
and explaining how Budget coordinates with trucking companies to place a customer 
with a moving company.  Budget also presented evidence that it was in compliance with 
licensing and other laws applicable to a moving broker.  Katz stated in her declaration 
that “Moving Brokers, like [Budget], are regulated by the Surface Transportation Board 
and [FMCSA],” and, because Budget has no trucks and is not a motor carrier, it is not 
required to “have a Department of Transportation number.”  Katz further stated that 
during its annual review by the Department of Transportation [DOT], Budget “has been 
found to be in compliance and exemplary in each instance,” and that Budget “is in 
compliance with the DOT/FMCSA regulations for relocation services brokers.”  Katz 
explained that as a moving broker, Budget is required to “utilize only DOT licensed and 
insured Household [Goods] carriers . . . [and] runs a daily license check to insure each of 
its carriers is licensed.”  Jasmine Medina, a Budget employee, stated in her declaration 
that each morning she “verifies that each and every carrier in the Budget Van Lines 
network has an active [DOT/FMCSA]” license. 
 Finally, the BBB argues that because it “was able to prove that [Budget] is a 
limited public figure” Budget was required to but did not “prove actual malice in order to 
recover in a defamation action.”  (See Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 
Cal.3d 244, 253.)  The BBB does not cite to anything in the record reflecting any finding 
by the trial court that Budget is a limited public figure.  Nor did the BBB cite the trial 
                                              
7  On appeal, the BBB does not differentiate between requirements applicable to a 
household goods moving broker like Budget and those applicable to a household goods 
moving company.  For example, when arguing that Budget did not conduct business in 
accordance with law, BBB refers to statutes and regulations that govern “household 
goods carriers.” 
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court to any evidence that Budget is a limited public figure.  The BBB, not Budget, had 
the burden on this issue.  (See Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & 
Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 [under § 425.16 “a defendant that 
advances an affirmative defense . . . properly bears the burden of proof on the defense”].)  
The BBB cites to excerpts of cases, but does not relate them to any specific facts 
concerning Budget.  The BBB cites to the entire 153-page declaration of its attorney, 
Nicholas Morgan, but does not identify any specific portion that contains facts 
purportedly proving that Budget is a limited public figure.  We therefore deem this 
argument waived.  (See Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. GoldenTree Asset 
Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 384 [“„reviewing court is not required to 
make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to 
support the judgment,‟” and it “„is the duty of counsel to refer the reviewing court to the 
portion of the record which supports appellant‟s contentions on appeal‟”]; Annod Corp. v. 
Hamilton & Samuels (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1301 [“[s]ince this argument is made 
without [adequate] citation to the record, it is deemed waived”].)  In any event, contrary 
to the BBB‟s contention, the fact that Budget has an extensive advertising campaign does 
not make Budget a limited public figure.  A “person in the business world advertising his 
wares does not necessarily become part of an existing public controversy.”  (Vegod Corp. 
v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 763, 770; see Carver v. 
Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 354 [plaintiff not a public figure for purposes of 
statements accusing him of false advertising]; Melaleuca, Inc. v. Clark, supra, 66 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1363 [plaintiff‟s “marketing activities did not make it a public figure or 
create a public controversy such that [the plaintiff] was required to show that defamatory 
statements about it were made with actual malice”].) 
 Considering the totality of the circumstances (Ruiz v. Harbor View Community 
Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1471), we conclude that Budget met its burden of 
presenting evidence that the statement that the company is “not in compliance with the 
law‟s licensing or registration requirement” is provably false, and showing that the 
statement is reasonably susceptible to the defamatory interpretation that Budget operates 
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its business in violation of the law.  Therefore, Budget made a sufficient showing of a 
probability of prevailing on its claim that the BBB‟s statements that Budget is “not in 
compliance with the law‟s licensing or registration requirement” constitutes libel per se.  
The trial court properly denied the BBB‟s special motion to strike on this ground.  (See 
Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 820 [under § 425.16, “„once 
a plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing on any part of its claim, the plaintiff has 
established that its cause of action has some merit and the entire cause of action 
stands‟”]; accord, Burrill v. Nair, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 379; Mann v. Quality Old 
Time Service, Inc., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.) 
 
  3. Grossly Misleading Advertising 
 The BBB‟s argument that its statement Budget‟s advertising was “grossly 
misleading” is not defamatory parallels its argument that its statement Budget was not in 
compliance with licensing requirements is not defamatory.  The BBB argues that it never 
stated that Budget‟s advertising was “grossly misleading.”  The BBB again asserts that 
this statement appears in the “Rating Explanation” for a “Company Rating F,” and that 
the statement applied not to Budget but only to a hypothetical company that might 
receive an “F” rating.  The BBB maintains that the only statement it made about Budget‟s 
advertising was, “Advertising Review:  No questions about the truth of this company‟s 
advertising [have] come to our attention,” and that this additional statement or 
qualification demonstrates that the “grossly misleading” advertising hypothetical did not 
apply to Budget. 
 We reject the BBB‟s argument that the “grossly misleading” advertising statement 
was only a hypothetical example for the same reasons that we reject the same argument 
with respect to the licensing noncompliance statement.  As with the licensing 
noncompliance statement, in the context of the Reliability Report, the average reader 
could reasonably be expected to focus on the words “BBB Rating F” for Budget and 
“Company Rating F, Our opinion of what this rating means,” which appear prominently 
near the top of the website page.  The average member of the BBB‟s website reading 
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audience would naturally and probably understand that the statement about “grossly 
misleading” advertising applied to the company that had received an “F” rating, and that 
company was Budget. 
 It is true, as the BBB suggests, that the phrase “grossly misleading” may in some 
contexts connote a privileged opinion rather than an actionable provably false statement 
of fact.  (See Summit Bank v. Rogers, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 695-696.)  However, 
“where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can 
constitute actionable defamation.”  (Id. at p. 696; see Wong v. Jing, supra, 189 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1370; Overstock, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., supra, 151 
Cal.App.4th at p. 701.)  The actual or imputed expertise of the defendant regarding the 
subject matter of a statement may reasonably lead the target audience to understand or 
believe that the statement is a factual one.  Although some accusations “when made by 
laymen might indeed constitute mere opinion, similar accusations by” certain 
professionals “carry a ring of authenticity and reasonably might be understood as being 
based on fact.”  (Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 Cal.3d 149, 154.) 
 For example, in Slaughter the court held that statements by a dental insurance 
company and its director to patients that a dentist was performing “„unnecessary‟” work 
and “„overcharging‟” were defamatory statements about the dentist and not protected 
opinions because the defendants were professional dental plan administrators, which gave 
their statements “a ring of authenticity.”  (Slaughter v. Friedman, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
pp. 153, 154.)  Similarly, in Gill v. Hughes (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1299, the court 
concluded that the statement by a committee of medical professionals “that plaintiff „is an 
incompetent surgeon . . .‟ implies a knowledge of facts which lead to this conclusion and 
further is susceptible of being proved true or false.  The fact that an evidentiary hearing 
was held regarding plaintiff‟s surgical technique and judgment supports this conclusion.  
Since the statement implies that plaintiff is generally disqualified for his profession, it is 
defamatory if it is false.”  (Id. at p. 1309.)  And in Kahn v. Bower, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 
1599, the court concluded that the statement by the director of a private psychological 
testing and counseling facility that referred to the plaintiff as an incompetent social 
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worker was not a privileged opinion but was actionable as a provably false factual 
assertion.  (Id. at pp. 1604, 1608-1609.)  The court stated that, because of the defendant‟s 
“professional status and that of the person to whom she wrote, [the] plaintiff‟s supervisor, 
the letter is susceptible of the interpretation that [the] plaintiff‟s incompetence is asserted 
as an „actual‟ condition, a matter of fact.”  (Id. at p. 1609.) 
 The BBB holds itself out as an expert on the professionalism and trustworthiness 
of businesses.  The BBB states that it evaluates companies and their advertising, 
advocates for “truth in advertising,” and promotes business integrity.  As described by 
Mitchell, the “BBB monitors advertising and works to correct abuses of truth in 
advertising,” “keeps track of the people and companies who perpetrate . . . scams,” and 
“issues public warnings” to consumers through BBB publications.  The BBB also 
investigates and acts on complaints of deceptive or unethical business practices about a 
company and governmental action against the company and then assigns “letter grade 
ratings to the company‟s business record based upon a proprietary formula” that analyzes 
data about the company.  The “Mission and Values” section of the BBB‟s website states:  
The “BBB is the resource to turn to for objective, unbiased information on businesses.  
Our network of national and local BBB operations allows us to monitor and take action 
on thousands of business issues affecting consumers at any given time.  [¶]  BBB is your 
key advisor, most reliable evaluator and most objective expert on the topic of trust in the 
marketplace.”  Because of the BBB‟s self-proclaimed expertise in evaluating companies 
and the claims in their advertising, a consumer reading a statement by the BBB that 
Budget‟s advertising was “grossly misleading” can reasonably be expected to interpret 
the statement as factual.  (See Chaker v. Mateo, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147; 
Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 389; see also Antwerp 
Diamond Exchange of America, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau (Ariz. 1981) 637 P.2d 
733, 738 [“„[u]sers of reports of mercantile agencies usually have utmost confidence in 
the accuracy of such reports and act accordingly‟”].)  As the court recently stated in 
Bentley Reserve L.P. v. Papaliolios:  “Internet posts where the „tone and content is 
serious,‟ where the poster represents himself as „unbiased‟ and „having specialized 
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knowledge,‟ or where the poster claims his posts are „Research Reports‟ or „bulletins‟ or 
„alerts,‟ may indeed be reasonably perceived as containing actionable assertions of fact.”  
(Bentley Reserve L.P. v. Papaliolios, supra, ___ Cal.App.4th at p. ___ [2013 WL 
3949029 at p. 8].)8 
 Contrary to the BBB‟s assertion, the appearance of the statement, “Advertising 
Review:  No questions about the truth of this company‟s advertising [have] come to our 
attention” in a less conspicuous place in the Reliability Report does not necessarily 
neutralize the defamatory nature of the “grossly misleading” advertising statement.  To 
the extent the “Advertising Review” may create an ambiguity regarding whether the 
“grossly misleading” advertising statement is actionable, as noted above, the legal 
question for us is “whether [the] statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory 
interpretation.”  (Smith v. Maldonado, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 647; see Summit Bank 
v. Rogers, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 696.)  We conclude that the “grossly misleading” 
advertising statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation, and 
therefore whether the statement is defamatory is a question for the trier of fact. 
 
  4. “F” Rating 
 Whether the BBB‟s grade of “F” for Budget is defamatory is a closer question.  
Those cases that have considered whether grading and rating systems are opinions or 
provably false statements of fact have generally concluded that they are nonactionable 
opinions.  (See, e.g., Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Research Group/US (8th Cir. 
2005) 416 F.3d 864, 870 [system that rated air charter service providers “on a scale of 1 
[to] 10” based on safety and other data was “ultimately a subjective assessment not an 
objectively verifiable fact” and therefore not actionable as defamation]; ZL Technologies, 
Inc. v. Gartner, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2010) 709 F.Supp.2d 789, 796-801 [rating the plaintiff in 
the defendant‟s lowest ranking, “Niche Player,” was subjective opinion not objective 
                                              
8  Budget does not dispute that such a statement would be injurious to Budget‟s 
reputation.  (See Shively v. Bozanich, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1242.) 
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fact]; Browne v. Avvo Inc. (W.D.Wash. 2007) 525 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 [comparative 
numerical ratings for attorneys were opinions and not actionable because “a reasonable 
person would understand that two people looking at the same underlying data could come 
up with vastly different ratings depending on their subjective views of what is relevant 
and what is important”]; Castle Rock Remodeling, LLC v. Better Business Bureau of 
Greater St. Louis, Inc. (Mo.App. 2011) 354 S.W.3d 234, 243 [the “BBB‟s „C‟ rating of 
[the plaintiff] is not sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false,” 
and “[a]lthough one may disagree with BBB‟s evaluation of the underlying objective 
facts, the rating itself cannot be proved true or false”]; Better Business Bureau of 
Metropolitan Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Services, Inc. (Tex.Ct.App. July 16, 2013) ___ 
S.W.3d ___, ___ [2013 WL 3716693 at p. 8] [“the „F‟ rating itself cannot be defamatory 
because it is the Bureau‟s self-described „opinion‟ of the quality of [the plaintiff‟s] 
services, which lacks a high degree of verifiability”].) 
 We need not resolve this issue to decide this appeal.  Budget made the required 
showing of a probability of prevailing on part of its cause of action for libel per se 
(actually, two parts: the licensing noncompliance statement and the grossly misleading 
advertising statement).  Therefore, the trial court properly denied the BBB‟s special 
motion to strike that cause of action.  (See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 820; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 106.) 
 
 C. Unfair Competition 
 The BBB argues that Budget “did not produce any evidence, let alone admissible 
evidence, to support its allegation that the BBB had done anything „unlawful, unfair, or 
fraudulent,‟” and that Budget “submitted no evidence that the BBB committed any 
unlawful act or practice, committed pursuant to a business activity that is forbidden by 
law.”  The BBB argues that Budget “utterly failed to even plead, let alone prove that the 
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BBB engaged in any „unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or injurious acts to 
consumers.‟”9 
 The UCL “„“establishes three varieties of unfair competition—[business] acts or 
practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.”  [Citation.]‟  [Citation.]”  
(Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 
351.)  The UCL also prohibits false or misleading advertising.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17200.)  The scope of the UCL is “„sweeping, embracing “„anything that can properly 
be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.‟”‟  
[Citations.]”  (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180; Bernardo, supra, at p. 351.) 
 Budget alleged in its UCL cause of action that the “BBB‟s actions in publishing 
false statements about [Budget and] its [other] competitors . . . constitute an unlawful, 
unfair, or fraudulent business practice and amount to unfair competition under the 
UCL.”10  Budget‟s UCL claim is derivative of its cause of action for libel per se.  (See 
Hawran v. Hixson, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th 256.)  The UCL “„borrows‟ violations from 
other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.  
[Citation.]”  (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143; 
                                              
9  The BBB does not argue that Budget failed to show a reasonable probability of 
prevailing by not making a sufficient showing that it had suffered injury in fact or lost 
money or property as a result of the unfair competition.  (See Stewart v. Rolling Stone 
LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 690.)  Budget submitted a declaration from an 
individual who had cancelled her contract with Budget because of the statements about 
Budget on the BBB‟s website, after reading that “the website said that the „F‟ [rating] 
was due to the fact that Budget Van Lines‟ advertising was „grossly misleading‟ and that 
it was not [in] compliance with certain laws and regulations.”  Budget also submitted 
evidence that it had lost “tens of thousands of dollars in revenue weekly as a result of the 
BBB‟s actions.” 
10  On appeal, Budget also argues that the BBB‟s business scheme constitutes unfair 
competition.  The trial court, however, sustained objections to portions of the record cited 
by Budget as supporting evidence, and Budget does not challenge these evidentiary 
rulings on appeal. 
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Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 486; Troyk v. 
Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1335.)  Because Budget made a 
sufficient showing of a probability of prevailing on its libel per se claim, Budget made a 
sufficient showing on its UCL claim.  Therefore, the trial court properly denied the 
BBB‟s special motion to strike the UCL cause of action.11 
 
 D. Injunction and Declaratory Relief 
 The BBB contends that issuing the injunction requested by Budget would violate 
the First Amendment‟s prohibition against prior restraints.  Budget, however, seeks a 
post-trial permanent injunction, and such an injunction is constitutional.  “An order 
prohibiting a party from making or publishing false statements is a classic type of an 
unconstitutional prior restraint. . . .   [¶]  The California Supreme Court recently 
recognized this fundamental principle, but held the rule does not apply to an order issued 
after a trial prohibiting the defendant from repeating specific statements found at trial to 
be defamatory.”  (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167-1168, italics 
omitted.)  In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, the case 
cited by Evans, the Supreme Court held that “following a trial at which it is determined 
that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction prohibiting the 
                                              
11  Citing Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 322, the BBB 
argues that, because its rating system is not commercial speech, it is absolutely protected 
by the First Amendment and cannot be the basis for a cause of action for unfair 
competition.  The BBB, however, does not attempt to define what commercial speech is 
or explain why its rating system and its website were not commercial speech.  The BBB 
quotes an excerpt from the hearing on Budget‟s special motion to strike where, in 
response to counsel for the BBB‟s question whether the trial court had concluded that the 
Reliability Report is commercial speech, the court replied, “Yes,” but the BBB does not 
explain the significance of this exchange.  Because the BBB has not presented a cogent 
legal argument on this issue, we treat the contention as forfeited.  (In re Marriage of 
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see Cahill v. San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“„“[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a 
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 
authority, we treat the point as waived”‟”]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1).) 
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defendant from repeating the statements determined to be defamatory.  [Citation.]  Such 
an injunction, issued only following a determination at trial that the enjoined statements 
are defamatory, does not constitute a prohibited prior restraint of expression.”  (Id. at 
pp. 1155-1156.)  Budget‟s request for a permanent injunction does not violate the 
Constitutional ban on prior restraints. 
 In addition, Budget may seek injunctive relief under its UCL cause of action.  (See 
In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 312.)  Because Budget made a sufficient 
showing of a probability of prevailing on its UCL cause of action to defeat the BBB‟s 
special motion to strike, Budget made a sufficient showing on its claim for an injunction 
against the BBB‟s alleged unfair business practices.12 
 Finally, the BBB contends that Budget‟s cause of action for declaratory relief fails 
because Budget failed to allege or prove “a judicial case or controversy.”  Again, the 
BBB has not provided any legal argument or authority in support of this contention, 
which we therefore treat as forfeited.  (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; 
In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) 
 
                                              
12  Although Budget conceded the first prong, we note that “[a]n injunction is a 
remedy, not a cause of action,” and section 425.16 “does not apply where it is the prayer 
for an injunction which arises from an act in furtherance of a person‟s right of petition or 
free speech.”  (Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 154, 162, fn. 
omitted; see Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1392 
[“the remedy sought does not affect whether the claim is based on protected activity”].) 
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DISPOSITION 
 
 The trial court‟s order denying defendant‟s special motion to strike under 
section 425.16 is affirmed.  Budget is to recover its costs on appeal. 
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